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Abstract
We explore the hypothesis that export policies and trade patterns of national players in the steam coal
market are consistent with non-competitive market behavior. We test this hypothesis by developing an
equilibrium model which is able to model coal producing nations as strategic players. We explicitly account
for integrated seaborne trade and domestic markets. The global steam coal market is simulated under several
imperfect market structure setups. We nd that trade and prices of a China - Indonesia duopoly t the real
market outcome best and that real Chinese export quotas in 2008 were consistent with simulated exports
under a Cournot-Nash strategy.
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1. Introduction
Recently, the development of global commodity prices has given serious cause for concerns about the
competitiveness of global commodity markets. This is especially true for natural resource markets and the
trade of fossil energy fuels in particular. While the foundation of OPEC in the 1960s can be viewed as a
well-known case for promoting strategic trade- and resource extraction policies, other markets for natural
resources have been politicized just recently. A prominent example is the rare earth elements industry in
China. Since 2008/09, the Chinese government made signicant eorts to bring this resource sector under
tight control by industry consolidation, creation of strategic stocks and, most importantly, by imposing trade
restrictions upon exports of rare earth elements. Whether the aim of this policy was indeed the conservation
of domestic resources or the preparation of monopoly power exploitation against high technology nations as
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June 7, 2011Japan and the West has been recently discussed (Hurst, 2010; Stone, 2009). Both examples also indicate
the variety of trade policy instruments. Next to cartelization and export quotas, governments levy taxes on
imports or subsidize exports. On markets where production takes place by a large number of small units (e.g.
for agricultural products), marketing of exports is often conducted by trade associations. On other markets,
exporting rms might be partly or entirely nationalized, being subject to governmental strategic inuence
(for instance natural gas exporters). Such trade policy instruments are intended to increase national welfare
by inuencing the market outcome in a non-competitive manner.
Another commodity market that raised doubts about its competitiveness is the market for internationally
traded steam coal (Tr uby and Paulus, 2011). For decades, international coal trade has been considered
competitive since production is geographically dispersed and is carried out by a blend of multinational private
mining companies, large state-run entities and various smaller national players. Yet, recent developments
in international steam coal trade have lead to concerns about market structure and conduct. And indeed,
several institutional developments support the hypothesis of steam coal market distortion. Firstly, strong
economic growth in Asia has lead to increased coal demand and thus shifted the center of gravity and price
setting from the Atlantic to the Pacic market area. Secondly, coal prices soared between 2006 and 2008
and remained relatively high since then. Thirdly, several recent adjustments of national resource strategies
of the People's Republic of China and Indonesia indicate an increasing potential for strategic behavior on a
national level in recent years1.
During the period of the 11th Five Year Plan (2005-2010) the People's Republic of China has adopted
several national policies in an attempt to restructure and streamline its domestic coal industry (NDRC,
2007). Further, Chinese authorities have signicantly lowered coal export quotas from 100 Mt in 2003 to
less than 50 Mt in 2008 and introduced export taxes for coal during this period thus increasing its tight
control over exports (NDRC, 2008).
Moreover, Indonesian steam coal production and exports have undergone a rapid expansion in recent
years which was paralleled by political eorts to nationalize the mining industry. Indonesian steam coal
exports jumped from 75 Mt in 2003 to an impressive 200 Mt in 2009 (IEA, 2010). This development indicates
a switch in the Indonesian national resource policy away from oil exports to coal exports. Indonesia pulled
out of OPEC in early 2009 in the eyes of diminishing oil stocks and production as well as strong domestic oil
demand. Therefore, Indonesia may be currently promoting the strategy to become the dominant player in
1These developments have aected several OECD countries severely and have increased concerns about security of supply, as
the major coal consuming nations depend heavily on imports of steam coal. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan import virtually
all of their coals and Europe's average import dependency amounts up to more than 60%.
2Asian coal markets to oset its declining oil revenues. The implementation of national resource policies in
China and Indonesia have led to a structural shift of steam coal supply in the pacic basin in recent years.
It may have given the authorities of either country the potential to exert market power on a national level.
This paper therefore analyzes the export patterns of major national players in the world steam coal
market to identify if Indonesian and Chinese resource policies support the hypothesis of strategic market
behavior on a national level. It is related to the empirical literature on strategic trade policy which has
developed since the seminal papers of Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) and
others. Empirical literature on strategic trade in energy resource markets has so far been scarce. Many
recent empirical contributions to this topic focus on international markets for agricultural goods and make
use of diverse methods of analysis (see Reimer and Stiegert (2006) for an overview). Alston and Gray (2000)
develop a simulation model to investigate wheat market conduct of the Canadian state trading enterprise.
Dong et al. (2006) for instance nd evidence for a quantity setting oligopoly to prevail in the international
malting barley market using a menu approach. Using a calibration approach McCorriston and MacLaren
(2010) assess the distorting impact of Chinese state trading enterprises on international agricultural markets.
We develop a static partial equilibrium model to test our hypothesis of non-competitive market behavior
exercised through strategic trade policy in global steam coal trade. The model allows us to simulate per-
fect competition as well as non-competitive market structures where players act under a Cournot behavior
assumption. We design the model as a mixed complementary program (MCP) by deriving the rst order
optimality conditions of the associated optimization problem. Modeling spatial equilibria in commodity
markets has already been scrutinized since Samuelson (1952) who applied linear optimization techniques for
competitive market structures. Takayama and Judge (1964) generalized spatial market economics for the
non-linear case and multi-commodity markets and Harker (1986a) and Yang et al. (2002) developed condi-
tions for various non-competitive spatial market equilibria. The application of such equilibrium modeling
techniques to analyze market conduct is an active eld of commodities research, e.g. in gas markets (Holz
et al., 2008; Egging et al., 2010), in electricity markets (M usgens, 2006; Lise and Hobbs, 2008) or in coking
coal markets (Graham et al., 1999).
The literature on non-competitive market conduct of national players in international steam coal trade so
far focuses on the maritime trade market which is a submarket of the global market and excludes domestic
markets. Kolstad and Abbey (1984) were the rst who applied a partial equilibrium model to analyze
strategic behavior in seaborne steam coal trade in the early 1980s. The authors nd that a non-competitive
market structure consisting of a duopoly and a monopsony simulated the actual trade patterns well. However,
3since then the steam coal trade market has changed substantially. In a recent paper, Haftendorn and Holz
(2010) analyze a number of major maritime coal trade routes and apply a mixed complementarity model
to test if trade volumes on these routes t competitive or oligopolistic behavior in the years 2005 and 2006.
Their results suggest that the steam coal trade market is better represented by perfect competition in the
analyzed periods. However, Tr uby and Paulus (2011) model total trade market volume in an equilibrium
approach and show that competitive models are unable to reproduce steam coal trade market equilibria in
2008.
Using our model, we test dierent hypotheses on market conduct and validate model results for the year
2008. In contrast to the majority of previous papers using equilibrium programming techniques, we validate
our results applying a series of non-parametric tests such as the Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test, Spearmann's
rank correlation coecient test as well as the Theil inequality coecient. Our main nding is that perfect
competition cannot explain market results, but a market structure setup with China and Indonesia acting
as non-cooperative Cournot players ts observed trade ows and prices in 2008 best. Ocial Chinese steam
coal export quotas in 2008 were consistent with simulated Chinese export volumes under a Cournot strategy.
Our paper extends the existing literature in two important ways: First, we account for interdependencies
and feedbacks between domestic and international steam coal markets by explicitly modeling all relevant
coal elds. Hence, we avoid strong assumptions on export potentials and extramarginal supply costs on the
seaborne trade market. Second, we outline a rationale and provide empirical evidence for strategic trade
policy on a national level to protably inuence steam coal market equilibria in 2008.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we outline what implications a trade
market-only vs. a global market analysis yields and then focus on potentials for market power sources of
several actors. We describe the model and data used in section 3. Main ndings are presented in section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Steam coal market economics
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and consumed in domestic
markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production was 5850 Mt (IEA, 2010). The two largest domestic
markets are China and the USA together comprising more than 65% of total production. About 13% of
the global steam coal production is exported and traded internationally and more than 90% of international
steam coal trade is seaborne.
4The seaborne export market can be divided into a Pacic and an Atlantic market region2. Major
importing regions in the Atlantic market are the USA and Europe (including neighboring Mediterranean
countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany at the top. Traditionally these importing regions are
primarily supplied by South Africa, Colombia and Russia.
The Pacic market has grown more dynamically in recent years. High quantities are imported by Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan - all three of them having virtually no indigenous coal production and therefore
heavily rely on imports. However, most of the growth has come from emerging import regions like India,
South East Asia and China. The supply side is dominated by Australia and Indonesia although the sustained
high prices in Asia have attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa and very recently also from
Colombia.
In the export market two dierent types of suppliers interact with each other: Countries that have
a dedicated export-oriented mining industry and countries with chiey inland-oriented mining industries
(Kopal, 2007; Bayer et al., 2009). The export-oriented countries primarily comprise South Africa, Colombia,
Australia and Indonesia and holds most of the supply capacity. These export industries usually have a cost
advantage over domestic industries due to good coal qualities, low mining costs and economical access to
transport infrastructure. Countries with mainly inland oriented mining supply primarily are China, USA,
India and Russia. These countries have some dedicated export collieries but a signicant part of the mining
capacity can serve both the national and the international market. However, interaction of dedicated export
mines and domestic markets and and domestic mines with export markets is during most times limited: coal
exporters often face a geographical disadvantage in supplying domestic markets as they are often located
close to the coast within the vicinity of export terminals. Frequently, these export mines are also not well
integrated into the domestic transportation railway system to allow for cost ecient movement of coals to
domestic power plants. Vice versa, mines serving the domestic markets are often located deeper inland3
and face high transport costs for moving coal to the export market. Furthermore, coal quality requirements
dier signicantly between the export and domestic markets, which means that coal upgrading, washing
and drying could be necessary to bring domestic coals to export standards.
2From a market integration perspective the steam trade coal market can be considered well integrated (Li, 2008; Warell,
2006). Nevertheless, we use this labeling in a qualitative way in the scope of this paper to better structure our analysis of
market actors.
3e.g. the Powder River Basin in the U.S., the coal bearing regions of Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia in China or several
Russian coal production regions (Schier and Ritschel, 2007).
52.1. Market structure
Before we formally investigate non-competitive behavior in the steam coal market we informally discuss
if there are indications that participants have actual potential to exercise market power. Market power
potential may exist in the steam coal market in the sense of single large coal producing and exporting
countries behaving in a non-competitive manner. This holds especially true for China and Indonesia.
China increasingly has made use of policy instruments, i.e. quotas and/or taxation, to tightly control
participation of Chinese rms in the international trade market in recent years4. Firstly, political regulations
require domestic mining companies to apply for special licenses which allow for a dened export volume.
Quotas on steam coal are set and allocated by Chinese institutions in a yearly manner; nevertheless they
may be subject to readjustments in case of political or economical requirements. E.g. the total export
volume restriction for steam coal in 2007 was 70 Mt and has been reduced to 47.7 Mt in 2008 (NDRC,
2007, 2008). Secondly, the Chinese government levies export taxes on steam coal. In 2008 export taxes
have been increased to 10% compared to no export tari for steam coal in 2007 (TRCSC, 2008). These
taxes signicantly increased costs of Chinese coal on the trade market and thus may have had an additional
impact on actual export volumes. Finally, political requirements in the coal industry consolidation process
have added heavy restrictions on market entry which have strengthened the position of a few very large
state-controlled coal companies (Sun and Xu, 2009).
While indications for market power executed on a nation-wide level are less obvious in Indonesia, there
exists a mine ownership structure which is quite special: mining rights have been awarded mostly to inter-
national mining companies in the early eighties. However, foreign investors were obliged to oer at least
fty one percent of shares to Indonesian companies or the government after ten years of mine production
(Baruya, 2009). Mining rights awarded in the nineties and later went exclusively to Indonesian companies.
This lead to the current situation, where the majority of steam coal mine production facilities in Indonesia
are owned by large Indonesian consortia5 or the government. The government is also actively controlling
export volumes to decrease speed of reserve exploitation as well as to cover rapidly growing domestic demand
(Kuo, 2008). An additional aspect is Indonesia's geography: a large amount of steam coal can be shipped
by barges via the navigable rivers of Kalimantan to oshore loading terminals or directly to Thailand or
South China (Schier and Ritschel, 2007). This means that Indonesian export infrastructure is practically
not capacity constrained, which may have allowed Indonesia to export higher volumes than it actually did
4Similar government policies on various raw materials are documented by Hurst (2010).
5One example is PT BUMI Resources which owns the mining companies PT Arutmin and PT Kaltim Prima Coal which
together accounted for 54 million tonnes or 32% of Indonesian steam coal exports in 2007.
6in 2008. One possible explanation could be that Indonesia actively pursued to limit exports in order to keep
international market prices at a higher level.
The exertion of market power may be supported by important barriers to entry and capacity expan-
sion restrictions in the steam coal market. Firstly, high political risk and/or the lack of nancial resources
and technical capability are eective barriers against the market entry of developing countries with so
far untapped high quality coal elds like Botswana, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Secondly, export capac-
ity expansion usually requires coordination of infrastructure and mining capacity upgrading with dierent
stakeholders being involved. This process can be very slowly as the example of South Africa shows, where
mining companies upgraded production and export terminal facilities but national railway expansion still
lags behind. Such restrictions are particularly delaying for greeneld projects which need access to transport
infrastructure.
2.2. Implications of an export market analysis vs. an integrated analysis of export and domestic markets
In the case of the coal market, previous literature has so far focused on testing for non-competitive
behavior in the export market. Even though interaction between domestic supply and dedicated export
supply is sometimes hampered by transport costs, limited transport capacity or coal quality, we argue that
interaction between domestic markets and international trade does exist 6. In the following, we consider
that a national player is an entity which maximizes welfare in its domestic market plus its producer rent
from sales to the export market less costs.
Proposition. If the export market price is suciently high, and dedicated export capacities are constrained,
then dedicated domestic production will enter the global market even if it has a cost disadvantage.
Proof: see Appendix.
Intuitively, domestic supply will enter the export market if marginal cost (including the cost disadvan-
tage of domestic production) equal marginal export revenues. If we consider that the national player acts
competitively, the marginal export revenue is equal to export market prices. In this case a setup only taking
into account the trade market will be rendered inconsistent if export prices just rise high enough. If the
national player pursues a non-competitive strategy (e.g.  a la Cournot), the same holds true. However,
export market prices have to be higher as in this case the national player will account for the price reduction
6This is especially true for some of the large domestic markets like China and the U.S. Historically, both countries have
adjusted their export volume depending on the dierence between the export market price and domestic market prices. Further,
transport infrastructure for domestic mines did not seem to be a bottleneck in 2008: Chinese coal exports peaked in 2005 with
exports of approximately 80 Mt. U.S. coal exports were around 100 Mt in the early 1990s. Therefore, coal exports in 2008 of
54 Mt in the case of China and 74 Mt in the case of the U.S. where most probably not constrained by transport capacity.
7inferred by supplying additional volumes to the export market. If we look at real coal prices in the export
market, and thus marginal revenues, it can be observed that they were particularly high in 2008 (IEA, 2010)
which makes an interaction of domestic supply and export markets quite likely.
Based on the information about the current market structure we dene three hypotheses for our inves-
tigation of potential non-competitive behavior in the steam coal trade market:
H1: steam coal market results in 2008 correspond to a perfectly competitive market setting.
H2: Indonesia acts as a strategic national player in the steam coal export market besides a competitive
fringe of other producers.
H3: China and Indonesia both act as non-cooperative strategic national players in the steam export coal
market besides a competitive fringe.
In the following, we will develop a large-scale empirical model to verify which hypotheses we can reject.
3. The model
In this section, we develop the model and describe the data we used. We will also outline our market
structure scenarios and depict statistical methods we will use to compare model results with actual data.
The model is structured to nd the spatial equilibrium of prices and trade ows between a given set of
players given assumptions about their conduct and objective functions. We model three types of players:
national producers which maximize their producer rents from sales to the export market in a Cournot fashion
and at the same time maximizing overall welfare in their domestic coal markets (strategic players); producers
which act in a competitive manner as price takers on the export market and also as welfare maximizers in
their domestic coal markets (competitive fringe); and demand regions without signicant coal production
which act as price takers. All producers maximize prots subject to a number of capacity constraints and
energy balance equations7.
As demonstrated by Salant (1982); Kolstad and Burris (1986) and recently by Lise and Krusemann (2008)
and by Montero and Guzman (2010), dierent types of Cournot games can be mapped by a term which
is a producer's conjecture about the response of other producers to a change in their production volume.
This term can be inserted in the producers pricing equation to reect that player's degree of market power.
7We model energy ows which accounts for consumers buying energy, not mass. All capacities and cost functions for
production and transport are normalized to a standard coal energy content in each mining region. This methodology has
already been used by Paulus and Tr uby (2010). For the sake of simplicity we suppress the energy-mass parameters in the
model formulation.
8This term can be viewed as oligopolistic rent of the producer trading at a price above his marginal costs of
supply.
3.1. Model statement
The model contains a topology of nodes n 2 N. All nodes can be subdivided into mining regions m 2 M,
export terminals e 2 E and demand regions d 2 D so that N = M [D[E. The roles of nodes are mutually
exclusive M \ D = ;, M \ E = ; and D \ E = ;. Further there exists a set of players p 2 P. In our
model, players are nations with signicant steam coal production. Players p 2 P control mining regions
m 2 Mp, export terminals e 2 Ep as well as demand regions d 2 Dp. Mining regions can only be controlled
by one player Mp \ Mp0 = ;; 8 p 6= p0, p;p0 2 P. This relation also holds true for export terminals
Ep \ Ep0 = ;; 8 p 6= p0, p;p0 2 P. Nodes are connected through transport arcs (i;j) 2 A  N  N. Sets,
parameters and variables of the model are found in the appendix in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: We rst develop the optimization problem, then
we state the corresponding rst-order optimality conditions solved by each player type. The rst-order
conditions together with the market-clearing conditions dene the Nash-Cournot game for the worldwide
steam coal market.
The variables in parentheses on the right hand side of each constraint are the Lagrange multipliers used
when developing the rst-order conditions. The complementary slackness condition is indicated by a ? sign,
where 0 = x ? y = 0 , xty = 0 for vectors x and y.
Prot maximization of producers
Player p 2 P maximizes his pay-o which is dened as producer rent from the export market plus overall
welfare from domestic coal markets minus costs for production, shipping and turnover. The pay-o function


















































d . POp is continuously dierentiable and concave in the case that Cp
m and vd
are continuously dierentiable and Cp
m is convex and vd is concave. Prot maximization for every producer
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(n;n0)) 8p 2 P; (n;n0) 2 A: (4)
Our model incorporates a complex network topology which allows for routing of sales volumes along
dierent paths and several nodes, we use the notion of path variables q
p
(n;n0) (Harker, 1986b). This concept
allows us to map trade ows from mines to demand regions along several intermediary nodes.
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d) 8p 2 P; d 2 D: (7)
The objective function (1) and equations (2) to (7) dene the maximization problem 
p. In case that
the objective function Pp is concave and all depicted constraints are convex and all functions are contin-
uously dierentiable, the formulated optimization problem can be represented by its rst order optimality
conditions. In this case, the rst order derivatives constitute necessary and sucient equilibrium conditions.
Producer optimality conditions
We develop the Lagrangian L of the original problem 
p. In the following, we derive the rst order
optimality conditions from L. The rst order partial derivative w.r.t. export volumes x
p
d between player



























tp!d  0 ? x
p
d  0; 8d 2 D : (8)
10The rst term is the price in node d, the second term gives the marginal cost of supply of player p to node
d. The third term is the Cournot markup depending on the marginal change of consumer price if player
p changes x
p
d marginally. We adjust prices by value added tax dierences and royalties between dierent
model regions by multiplying export prices with the term tp!d. In equilibrium, if x
p
d  0, the achieved price
of exports pd has to oset marginal costs of supply to node d and the marginal price decrease caused by this
export ow in d.
The Cournot player perceives that the demand function in d is downward sloping and thus can extract
an oligopolistic producer rent. His sales decision for d also depends on his perception on how sales of


























= rp!d is the aggregate conjecture of player p on how export ows from all other players p 2 P 
change given a change in its own export trade volume to demand region d. For perfect competition, rp!d
equals -1 and for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium this term equals 08.
P behaves as a welfare maximizer in his domestic national markets. First-order pricing conditions for
P's supply x
p
d in domestic markets d 2 Dp are dened as:
vd(Xd)   
p
d  0 ? x
p
d  0; 8d 2 Dp; (10)
which means that P is behaving as a price taker in its domestic markets.
Single mining regions are assumed to behave competitively, supplying at marginal cost levels plus scarcity









m  0 ? sp
m  0; 8m 2 Mp: (11)
For the mine production cost Cp
m, we choose a function of production volume sp
m according to Golombek
and Gjelsvik (1995). In their paper the authors present a production cost function, for which the marginal
supply cost curve has an intercept m  0, then follows a linear trend with slope m  0 until production
reaches almost the capacity limit. As soon as the supply level approaches production capacity limits the
marginal costs can increase exponentially depending on a parameter m  0. The economic intuition behind
this functional form for marginal costs is that prices during periods with higher demand are in reality often
8Kolstad and Burris (1986) for example elaborate more on this topic. Such games were applied in equilibrium energy market
modeling e.g. by Graham et al. (1999), Chen et al. (2006) or Lise and Krusemann (2008).
11set by older mine deposits. As geological conditions decline, these mines face signicantly higher costs and
have to reduce their production output due to geological constraints and limited reserves. These high-cost
mine elds serve as spare capacity during demand peaks and reduce their output if demand declines.











m) 7! R+ for player p 2 P and mine m 2 Mp is dened as:
cp
m(sp
m) = m + msp
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m  0: (12)
Price eciency conditions have to hold for every transport connection (n;n0) 2 A. For transport con-
nections going out from mining regions m 2 M and from demand regions d 2 D price eciency is that
marginal costs of supply p
n and 
p
n0 only dier by transport costs and a possible markup for scarcity rents
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similar conditions hold for transport connections going out from export terminals but include an addi-
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Market clearing conditions
In addition to the derived rst order optimality conditions we assume that there is no market power
on the demand side and that all markets in demand regions d 2 D are cleared when players have decided
on their strategies. We choose a linear, strictly decreasing demand function vd(Xd) : R+ 7! R+ of the

















d are the demand elasticity, reference price and total reference
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tp!d  0 ? x
p
d  0 8d 2 D: (17)
If we bundle the equations (15) with the rst order conditions (17), (11), (13), (14) and capacity constrains
(2) to (7) for all producers p 2 P, the unique solution to this set of (non)linear inequalities yields the
equilibrium for the market. The resulting system of inequalities is known as a mixed complementarity
problem. This problem is implemented in GAMS and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson,
1998).
3.2. Model parametrization
Our assumptions on reference volumes, and for price elasticities of coal demand in Europe are explained
in detail in Tr uby and Paulus (2011)9. Demand elasticities for other regions are based on a broad literature
review of econometric analyses on inter-fuel substitution. While methodological approaches as well as the
age of the reviewed articles dier, all authors agree that price elasticity of steam coal demand is inelastic
j  j< 1. In this paper, we assume a price elasticity of steam coal demand for -0.3 for the other world regions
beside Europe.
Information on costs and capacities in the steam coal market is only available from a multitude of
heterogeneous sources. We use an extensive steam coal market database in this analysis that has already
been presented and used in one of our former analyses (Paulus and Tr uby, 2010) and Tr uby and Paulus
(2011)10.
We consider it crucial to capture not only isolated steam coal trade market economics but also the inter-
dependencies between the large domestic markets and the trade market. Therefore, we have implemented a
detailed network topology consisting of several dozen mining regions, export terminals and demand regions
(see Table 1). Note that our model includes the two largest domestic markets, China and the US, which
together accounted for 65% of global hard coal production and 66% of global consumption. Other major
9In this article, we use existing large-scale power sector dispatch models for Europe and iteratively test a high number of
steam coal price points. The model returns a minimum cost power plant dispatch as well as steam coal consumption. The
results show that the steam coal demand elasticity in the European power sector was relatively low, -0.43 in 2008.
10Relevant publications on steam coal markets are available from public institutions like the IEA (2009) or the EIA (2007,
2010a,b). Comprehensive information is especially obtained from the published reports of the IEA Clean Coal Center, e.g.:
Baruya (2007, 2009); Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker and Kowalchuk (2008). Furthermore, Ritschel (2010) and Schier
and Ritschel (2007) depict recent developments in the hard coal markets. Further publications include analyses from employees
working for international utilities as for example Bayer et al. (2009) and Kopal (2007). Industry yearbooks provide useful
information as it is the case for China (NBS, 2008; CCII, 2007). National statistics bureaus and mineral ministries provide
high quality information as for example ABARE (2008) and ABS (2006). Not mentioned are a larger number of coal company
annual reports as well as information based on expert interviews. Information on average energy content is based on Ritschel
(2009); IEA (2009) and BGR (2008). For Australia, ABS (2006) delivers detailed information, Baruya (2007) compares dierent
mining input factor structures on the global scale. Furthermore, our analysis is based on several extensive research projects of
Tr uby and Paulus (2010) and Eichm uller (2010) at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne.
13domestic markets are Russia and India which have also been taken into account.
Table 1: Model topology
Mining regions & export terminalsa Demand regions
Australia 5 Russia 4
South Africa 3 U.S. 7
Indonesia 2 China 8
Russia 8 India 3
Colombia 2 Poland 2
Venezuela 2 Europe 3
Vietnam 2 Japan 1
U.S. 6 Korea (S.) 1
China 10 Taiwan 1
India 6 Asia, other 1
Poland 3
abold faced entries are countries with large domestic steam coal markets which have been explicitly modeled.
3.3. Market structure scenarios
We simulate the global steam coal market trade for 2008 under four dierent assumptions on market
conduct and the nature of Chinese export quotas to test our hypotheses:
Perfect competition without Chinese export quota: This scenario assumes that all producers and
consumers act in a competitive manner. We further assume no Chinese export quotas in this scenario
to assess how unconstrained Chinese export patterns would have looked like and how they would have
inuenced the steam coal market.
Perfect competition with Chinese export quota: This scenario also assumes perfectly competitive
behavior of market players but incorporates the Chinese export quota as a xed export restriction.
Thus, we assume that the export quota was not necessarily set under strategic welfare maximization
objectives, but could exist due to other political objectives like the conservation of domestic resources.
With this scenario, we may test for the competitiveness of the global steam coal market.
Indonesian monopoly with Chinese export quota: In this scenario we assume that Indonesia, the
largest exporter acts as a strategic national player besides a competitive fringe of other market players.
The Chinese export quota is modeled as a xed export restriction for the Chinese player. This scenario
lets us test for non-competitive behavior of Indonesia.
China - Indonesia duopoly: Besides their large market shares, Indonesia and China face special polit-
ical, geographical and institutional characteristics which could potentially support non-competitive
14behavior. We therefore model both countries as non-cooperative strategic players. With this scenario
we may investigate if Chinese export quota setting is consistent with a prot maximizing Cournot
strategy, together with Indonesian market power.
3.4. Model validation using statistical tests
We assess the forecasting abilities of the model by comparing trade ows as well as trade ow shares as
a fraction of total trade with the actual values in 2008. We also validate model prices with real price data.
In order to validate which of the market conduct scenarios ts the observed data best, we employ a
series of statistical techniques. Using common parametric tests in such a setup would lead to the violation
of several assumptions, most importantly, that the error term is normally distributed. Alternatively, it is
possible to use non-parametric tests, which do not make the same assumptions on distributions. We use two
non-parametric tests to validate our results: the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sign test and Spearman's rank correlation
coecient test.
The Wilcoxon-Sign-Rank test evaluates on the basis of a paired sample the signed-rank correlation
between the sets (Wilcoxon, 1945). We employ this test on the modeled trade ow share matrix M and
the observed trade ow share matrix O. (mpd;opd) are the corresponding modeled and observed trade ow
shares for all p 2 P and d 2 D. The null hypothesis is that the model results predict actual trade.
An alternative test, which is also distribution free is Spearman's rank correlation coecient test. Similar
to Abbey and Kolstad (1983) and Graham et al. (1999) we try to nd if the observed trade shares and the
error between predicted and observed values has no rank-correlation, which would indicate that there is no
association between the error terms and the actual values. The regression of the observed values opd against
the predicted values mpd yields the regression equation:
opd =  + mpd + ^ upd; 8p 2 P; d 2 D
If our model would perfectly simulate each trade ow share, then  = 1 and  = 0. To test for these
parameter values, we let ^ upd = opd   mpd and test the extend of rank correlation between opd and ^ upd by
applying Spearman's rank correlation coecient. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between
observed values and the error term between modeled and actual values or, equivalently, that the model
predicts the observed market outcome.
Furthermore, we also employ statistics without testing for interference: the Theil inequality coecient
is the root mean squared error of two datasets scaled to the [0;1] interval (Theil, 1966). It measures how
distant both datasets are from each other in a statistical sense. In case of the Theil coecient equaling zero,
15the modeled trade shares are exactly the same as the actual ones. Therefore, the lower the Theil coecient,
the better the model suites as an indicator for the real market. Further information can be obtained by
calculating the covariance proportion, the variance proportion and the bias proportion of the mean squared
error (MSE). A good quality forecast should have a MSE which is mostly explained by the unsystematic
error. In this case, the bias and the variance proportion should be close to zero and the covariance proportion
close to one.
4. Results
Table 2 reports results on statistical inference, as well as on several other statistics in the four simulated
scenarios. Both perfect competition assumptions are rejected by the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test on the 90%
condence level (95% level in the scenario without export quota). Both non-competitive scenarios cannot be
rejected at typical condence levels. The Spearman rank correlation test rejects the two perfect competition
scenarios as statistically signicant estimators for the actual market outcome on the 95% level. Again both
non-comeptitive scenarios cannot be rejected at typical condence levels.
The other statistics further conrm the non-competitive setups: the Theil inequality coecient as well as
the RMSPE are far lower than in the perfect competition scenarios. However, for both statistics the China
- Indonesia duopoly scenario even outperforms the Indonesia monopoly scenario. The values for covariance
proportion and for the variance proportion are also the best in the China - Indonesia duopoly setup. The
bias proportion is the lowest (best) in the perfect competition with export quota scenario, nevertheless, the
bias proportion is also relatively low in the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario with 2%.
The international seaborne trade market size is an endogenous variable to the model as we account for
interactions of the trade market with the domestic markets. We therefore compare how good the model
results for the total trade market volume t the actual gures. In the perfect competition scenario without
export quota, the simulated trade market volume is 20% larger than the actual market size in 2008. In this
scenario, Indonesia and especially China signicantly increase their exports to cover the high international
demand in the year 2008. This leads to a drastic increase in traded steam coal volumes in the pacic
area. In the perfect competition scenario with export quota, Chinese export volumes are constrained which
leads to a lower overall trade market volume. The China - Indonesia duopoly setting sees the best market
volume t with the trade market being only 4% larger than in reality. China as the largest producer and
Indonesia as the largest trade market exporter withhold volumes in a Cournot manner. Under the Cournot
assumption, simulated Chinese exports (43.3 Mt) almost exactly meet the export quota (47.8 Mt). This
16Table 2: Comparison of statistics of actual and modeled treade ows in 2008
Test statistics













Spearman 0.328** 0.259** 0.186 0.162
zWilcoxon 2.53** 1.80* 1.17 0.62
Theil 0.42 0.352 0.214 0.152
Error term decomposition:
-Covariance proportion 0.934 0.848 0.835 0.935
-Variance proportion 0.078 0.165 0.174 0.063
- Bias proportion 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.018
RMSPE [%] 23.5 16.9 11.6 7.9
Results on market size in Mt
Total trade volume 732 659 645 628 608
aSpearman is the Spearman rank correlation coecient, zWilcoxon is the statistic for the Wilcoxon sign rank test, Theil is
the Theil inequality coecient and Uc is its covariance proportion. Bold case indicates the lowest Theil statistic or that the
covariance (variance,bias) proportion is closest to one (closest to zero). The same holds for the root mean-squared percentage
error (RMSPE). The null hypothesis for both tests is that the model can predict trade in 2008. Signicant on the 90% level.
Critical values: Spearman=0.213 and j zWilcoxon j=1.650.
Signicant on the 95% level. Critical values: Spearman=0.253 and j zWilcoxon j=1.960.
Signicant to the 99% level. Critical values: Spearman=0.329 and j zWilcoxon j=2.576.
Critical values are based on Zar (1972) and McCornack (1965).
17means that the Chinese export policy was consistent with a Cournot-Nash strategy11 in 2008. Additionally,
the Cournot competition leads to a diversication of Chinese exports similar to reality with Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan being the main destinations12, in all scenarios where China acts competitively, China
exports exclusively to South Korea.
A similar observation can be made for Indonesia: Indonesian supply is similarly diversied as actual
values in both non-competitive scenarios. In the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario, simulated Indonesian
exports (160.4 Mt) almost match actual values (157.4 Mt, energy-adjusted). This is in contrast to the perfect
competition scenarios, where Indonesia's absolute exports are more than 30 million tonnes higher. Also, in
the competitive scenarios exports from Indonesia to China are strikingly higher than in reality. In general,
the China - Indonesia duopoly setup clearly outperforms both perfect competition scenarios. The China -
Indonesia duopoly setup also performs better than the Indonesia monopoly with export quota scenario in all
statistics but the bias proportion. However, both non-competitive scenarios cannot be rejected as predictors
of actual market outcome.
A further relevant indicator to analyze model forecasting quality are prices. The RMSPE for the per-
fect competition scenario without export quota (with export quota) is 21.7% (18.7%). For the Indonesia
monopoly with export quota scenario the RMSPE is 4% and for the China -Indonesia duopoly scenario 3.6%.
Figure 1 plots actual against simulated prices. We observe that prices in the perfect competition setups are
approximately 15-20 USD/t lower in Europe and up to 40 USD/t lower in the main Asian importing regions
than observed prices. Simulated import prices in China are higher than in reality. Furthermore, we see that
prices between both perfect competition scenarios do not dier greatly, even though Chinese exports are 70
Mt lower as Indonesia is still exporting above its observed values.
Model prices for both non-competitive scenarios t the observed values better. While simulated import
prices meet the actual European price levels, this scenario also fairly accurately replicates actual prices in
the Asian import regions. The best price t for China has the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario: here,
the Cournot mark-up of Chinese exports leads to a larger price delta between other Asian import regions
and Chinese domestic demand regions which basically protects the Chinese coal market and reduces coal
consumer prices.
11Of course this does not necessarily mean that China is a strategic player.
12Trade ows are more diversied in the non-competitive equilibrium compared to the perfectly competitive market out-
come. In the Cournot game rms with higher marginal costs of delivery (e.g. due to high transport costs to distant demand
regions) have lower market shares in the respective demand regions. Lower market shares however imply higher perceived
marginal revenues for a player. Since the Cournot oligopolists equate marginal revenues to marginal costs, the higher perceived
marginal revenue may justify trade with regions that would cost-wise not occur in a perfectly competitive market. For a more
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Figure 1: Comparison of actual and simulated prices for important import regions
Simulated Japanese import prices may not be completely explained even in the China-Indonesia setup13.
Besides these deviations, both non-competitive scenarios deliver the most accurate reproduction of actual
import prices.
Considering the actual and simulated trade ow matrices, the perfect competition setups feature a less
diversied structure of supply than the non-competitive scenarios (see Table 6 in the appendix).
4.1. Costs of non-competitive behavior
As it is known from economic theory, perfect competition (c.p.) leads to the highest overall welfare
compared to a scenario with non-competitive market behavior. The baseline in Figure 2 is therefore the
perfect competition scenario without Chinese export constraints.
In the perfect competition scenario with Chinese export quota, China accrues less welfare due to its export
restriction. Indonesian rents increase to a certain extend due to slightly higher world market prices. In the
Indonesia monopoly scenario, Indonesian rents increase by around 3 bn $ as the withholding of Indonesian
13Besides statistical errors and dierences in energy-mass conversions, coal quality is a factor which may let model results
deviate from real trade patterns. Especially in Japan, newer coal red power plants are highly ecient but very limited in the
types of steam coal that they may use for generation. Coal specications on sulfur, ash content, moisture and volatile matter
are important determinants for coal-red power plants. This dependence may sometimes lead to a certain price inelasticity of
demand for certain coal types. Trade patterns and price eects caused by coal quality requirements beyond energy content are
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Figure 2: Welfare eects in the investigated scenarios (horizontal lines represents the perfect competition scenario without
export quota).
supply on top of the Chinese export quota increases consumer prices signicantly. In this scenario, Chinese
welfare eects are close to zero, as positive revenue eects due to higher consumer Asian prices and negative
eects due to the export quota compensate each other. Overall global welfare eects are negative due to
lower consumer rents especially in the main Asian importing nations of Japan, Taiwan, and South-Korea
but also in Europe.
In the China - Indonesia duopoly setup, China accrues additional rents14 of 1.4 bn USD while oligopolistic
rents of Indonesia decrease slightly. Chinese rents increase as exports are distributed with regard to prot
maximization targets. This leads to a broader (and more realistic) diversication of Chinese export ows
compared to the scenarios where China acts as a competitive player. Consumer prices for steam coal in
China are slightly lower compared to the Indonesia monopoly scenario, which positively aects Chinese
consumer rents.
Summarizing our ndings, we conclude that hypothesis H1 (perfect competition) can be clearly rejected
as prices and trade ow patterns cannot explain the real market outcome. Both non-competitive scenarios
cannot be rejected as predictors of actual trade. Indonesian and Chinese exports are more accurately
distributed compared to their counterparts in the perfect competition setup. Furthermore, total Indonesian
export volumes t better in the non-competitive setups. Of the two non-competitive setups, the China -
14We also account for welfare changes in the domestic Chinese steam coal market.
20Indonesia duopoly scenario performs slightly better in several statistics, trade ows and prices. Interestingly,
the Cournot-Nash strategy for China reproduces almost exactly the Chinese export quota. Additionally,
positive welfare eects for China are the highest in this setup.
Therefore, we cannot reject both H2 (Indonesian monopoly with Chinese export quota) and H3 (China -
Indonesia duopoly). However, the China - Indonesia duopoly outperforms the Indonesia monopoly scenario
in seven of the eight statistics we computed (see Table 2). The duopoly scenario also shows the highest
welfare accruement for China. In the background of the general proactive national energy resource security
policy in China, one may therefore even support the acceptance of H3.
5. Conclusions
Due to the increasing demand for mineral resources in recent years, several resource-rich nations have
reassessed and adjusted their national resource policies. They have applied dierent instruments of strategic
trade policy such as export quotas and taxes. However, it may not always be clear if these resource policies
serve conservation of natural resources or maximization of national rent inows from resource exports.
We empirically investigated this question for the case of the global steam coal market by testing for non-
competitive market conduct of China and Indonesia. Both countries have implemented or signicantly
realigned their coal export strategies in recent years.
For this purpose, we developed a partial equilibrium model which allowed us to model individual nations
as strategic players, maximizing their domestic welfare as well as their rents from exports subject to a
Cournot-Nash strategy. We described how China and Indonesia could potentially exercise market power
in reality and derived two non-competitive market conduct setups from this investigation. We applied
several statistical tests to avoid arbitrary modeling results. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that we
cannot reject two non-competitive market setups as predictors of the actual steam coal market in 2008. Test
statistics indicate that the China - Indonesia duopoly scenario is the better predictor than the Indonesia
monopoly scenario. We also found that Chinese export quotas are consistent with simulated Chinese export
volumes under a Cournot-Nash strategy which gives further strength to our hypothesis regarding strategic
behavior of China.
We nd that it is crucial to account not only for export markets, but also for the domestic markets
respecting their interactions and feedbacks if one analyses potential market power of strategic national
players. If export market prices rise high enough, a national player will redirect domestic volumes to the
export market as marginal revenues are higher. Therefore one may expect that the large Chinese supply
21compensates for any international coal demand shock or export capacities withheld, however, our analysis
shows that this is not the case due to Chinese strategic trade policies applied.
These ndings yield implications for policy makers in nations depending on coal imports: future supply
and prices for internationally traded coal might possibly not be as cheap, stable and secure as believed
by most market participants if emerging Asian nations increasingly pursue their national resource export
strategies. This could make a reevaluation of the future role of coal in energy consumption of such countries
necessary, as especially cheapness and abundance has been often cited as the main competitive advantage
of coal compared to other energy sources.
On a more general level, our ndings indicate that the increasing inuence of non-western countries
on world resource markets might change the current world trade paradigm. Strategic trade policy might
become important also for markets which have been perceived as competitive before.
Possible future research could extend the analysis of strategic national players to account for the com-
plete fuel complex or to internationally traded non-energy minerals. A multilateral market power analysis
accounting for market power on the importer's side may also be an appropriate research venue.
22Appendix
Proof of proposition in section 2.2: We consider a setup with a national player A which controls
two rms which can produce a single commodity x: F1 (exporter) and F2 (domestic supplier). Further,
there exists a domestic market D and an export market E where x can be sold to (price-taking) customers.
Let x1;D, x1;E and x1 = x1;D + x1;E be the supply of F1 to the domestic market, the supply of F1 to the
export market and its total supply, respectively. The same holds for F2. C1 and C2 are the respective
convex cost functions of F1 and F2 with c1(x1) =
@C1(x1)
@x1 > 0 8x1 and c2(x2) =
@C2(x2)
@x2 > 0 8x2. The
maximum production capacity of F1 is limited to K. We assume that the exporter faces a cost disadvantage
if supplying the domestic market and that the domestic supplier faces a cost disadvantage if supplying the
export market. This cost disadvantage of both rms is represented by constant cost terms t1;D > 0 8x1;D
and $ = t2;E > 0 8x2;E for F1 and F2, respectively. The cost terms are dened such that c1(x1) + t1;D >
c2(x2) 8x1;x2 2 [0;K] and c2(x2)+ t2;E > c1(x1) 8x1;x2 2 [0;K] hold. Let further U and V be the volume
supplied to the export and the domestic market, with U = x1;E + x2;E and V = x1;D + x2;D. The inverse
demand functions in both markets are decreasing in volumes.
We consider that A maximizes welfare in the domestic market D plus his producer rent from sales to




pD(V )dV + pE(U)U   c1(x1)   c2(x2)   T(x1;x2:
In the following, we will compare a setup where A controls F1 and F2 and has access to export and
domestic markets (export&domestic setup) with a setup that only accounts for the export market and A
only controlling F1 (export-only setup). We will show that x2;E can actually be greater zero rendering the
export-only setup inconsistent.
Let  be the capacity scarcity mark-up (dual variable) associated with the production constraint K for
F1. In case of a binding export capacity constraint K the equilibrium condition for rm A to supply the








1;E = K; x
0
2;E = 0: (18)
which simply means that marginal revenue equal marginal costs plus the scarcity rent. Equilibrium































































2) + t2;E if x
1;E = K: x
2;E > 0: (20)





> 0; if  = c2(x
2) + t2;E   c1(K)
= 0; if  < c2(x
2) + t2;E   c1(K)
(21)
in the export&domestic setup.
Capacity scarcity is a function of the dierence in export supply costs between both rms. In case of
x2;E > 0, F2 covers the residual export market demand after F1's maximum export market supply has been
deducted (see Figure 3). F2 will start supplying the export market as soon as its marginal export revenue
equals marginal costs. In this case, the resulting price bias is:
pE(U
0












which is always greater zero in the case of a decreasing demand function as total export market supply
U = K+x2;E in the export&domestic setup is greater than export supply in the export-only setup U
0
= K.
The same inconsistency occurs if A acts in a competitive manner in the export market. However, the
24price bias is even higher: A would not account for the export price reduction inferred by delivering additional
supply to the export market if it acts as a price taker. Thus, marginal revenue from supplying the export
market equals export price leading to a even higher redirection of domestic supply. In this case, domestic
supply to the export market acts as a backstop for export market prices in the case we also consider the
domestic market. The price bias in a competitive setup would therefore be:
pE(U
0
)   pE(U) = 
0
  (c2(x
2) + t2;E   c1(K)): (23)
25Table 3: Model sets and indices
n 2 N Model region nodes
m 2 M  N Mining region nodes
e 2 E  N Export terminal nodes
d 2 D  N Demand region nodes
(i;j) 2 A  N  N Transport arcs
p 2 P Model players
m 2 Mp  M Mine regions controlled by player p
e 2 Ep  E Export terminals controlled by player p
Table 4: Model parameters
C
p
m Production cost function of player p in mine region m
Cap
M
m Mining capacity in mining region m
Cap
E
e Throughput capacity at export terminal e
Cap
T








e Turnover costs at export terminal e
ad Intercept of inverse demand function in demand region d
bd Slope of inverse demand function in demand region d
t
p!d VAT adjustments for exports from player p to demand region d
r
p!d Player p`s aggregate conjecture for demand region d of how exports of all other com-
petitors change given a change in its own export volume
Table 5: Model variables
s
p
m Production of player p in mining region m
q
p
(n;n0) Transport volume of player p from node n to node n
0
vd Import price for player p in region d
x
p
d Trade volume from player p from mining region m to demand region d

p
n Dual variable associated with the energy balance constraint representing marginal
costs of supply of player p to node n

p
m Dual variable associated with the mine capacity constraint representing mine capacity
scarcity rent of player p in mining region m

p
e Dual variable associated with the export terminal capacity constraint representing
export capacity scarcity rent of player p in export terminal e
(n;n0) Dual variable associated with the transport capacity constraint representing transport
capacity scarcity rent on arc an;n0
26Table 6: Actual and modeled steam coal trade market ows in million tonnes in 2008
Japan Korea (S.) Taiwan U.S. China Europe India Other
Actual trade volumes in Mt
Indonesia 24.4 23.2 23.7 2.1 22.2 19.1 19.0 23.8
Colombia 27.8 35.9 9.5
Australia 74.1 20.5 20.6 0.1 1.7 2.8 0.8 6.2
South Africa 0.1 1.0 0.8 48.2 7.9 3.7
Russia 8.9 6.4 0.9 0.5 68.4 0.6
U.S. 0.3 0.3 0.2 13.5 0.1 4.0
China 11.8 16.7 11.2 0.1 1.7 0.8 1.6
Other 2.0 0.9 2.5 16.8 11.0 7.5
Trade shares for China - Indonesia duopoly without export quota
Indonesia 16.1 15.9 19.9 38.7 21.5 25.0 23.2
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 79.3 27.5 23.7
South Africa 6.4 42.0 14.1
Russia 23.4 69.3
U.S. 21.6 10.4 6.5
China 12.6 8.9 6.4 7.3 5.2 2.9
Other 4.1 15.1 15.3
Trade shares for Indonesia monopoly with export quota
Indonesia 15.3 15.9 19.9 55.4 19.8 22.9 22.6
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 93.9 36.6
South Africa 39.0 22.2 1.3
Russia 12.0 11.4 69.3
U.S. 8.7 22.9 6.9
China 48.6
Other 4.1 15.1 14.9
Trade shares for perfect competition with export quota
Indonesia 36.7 32.2 64.7 29.3 26.0
Colombia 25.9 40.0
Australia 77.0 53.5





Trade shares for perfect competition without export quota
Indonesia 0.5 15.9 65.4 79.9 27.2
Colombia 34.3 31.5
Australia 58.7 71.8
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